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Recognizing the significant effort underway to integrate UAV operations in the NAS, a 
preliminary hazard analysis was conducted for two critical hazards of UAV operation. 
Models were developed to describe UAV ground impact and midair collisions. Under several 
assumptions, a model of ground impact was used to calculate the UAV system reliability 
required to meet a target level of safety, for different UAV classes differentiated by mass. 
The model showed a significantly higher reliability required for high-mass UAVs, and a 
large variation in reliability required with population density, with a two order of magnitude 
increase over metropolitan areas. Midair collision risk was estimated in the vicinity of 
airways using a model of aircraft collisions based on the density of air traffic in those 
regions. There is a two order of magnitude difference in risk between on-airway and on-
altitude operation and operation away from airways and off major flight levels. Therefore, 
there are potential operating strategies that can reduce the risk of UAV operation, such as 
procedural separation from high population and high traffic areas. There are also additional 
mitigation possibilities to further reduce the risk of integrating UAVs in the NAS. 
Nomenclature 
Aexp = area of exposure 
d = distance traveled by air traffic within airspace segment 
ELS = expected level of safety 
MTBF = mean time Between failures resulting in ground impact 
Pfat | coll = probability of fatality given a potential collision 
Ppen = probability of penetration 
Pmit = probability of mitigation preventing a ground fatality 
ρ = population density 
t = time 
V = airspace volume 
I. Introduction 
 
he success of recent military deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in Iraq and Afghanistan has 
both raised public awareness of UAVs and proven their operational viability. This has led to an increasing 
demand for the ability to operate UAVs for a variety of applications over the United States. However, the current 
Federal Aviation Regulations did not anticipate the operation of unmanned aircraft in the NAS. Therefore, there are 
no regulations currently applicable to UAVs. Current UAV operation in the NAS has been limited to flights 
approved through a lengthy Certificate of Authorization process. 
T 
The lack of clear regulations has been a barrier to achieving benefits from potential commercial and civil 
operations. Recognizing this barrier, a significant effort is currently underway to integrate UAV operations into the 
National Airspace System (NAS)1. One fundamental requirement for operation in the NAS is to preserve the safety 
of the general public. Therefore, the implications for different classes of UAV operation should be examined based 
upon the requirement to operate at an equivalent level of safety. The purpose of this paper is to identify potential 
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design requirements and approaches for integrating different classes of UAVs into the NAS that meet FAA system 
safety requirements. 
II. Range of Classifications & Capabilities 
In considering potential UAV 
operations in the NAS, it is important 
to recognize that the label “Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle” can be applied to a 
broad range of vehicle types, 
configurations, and sizes. This broad 
spectrum is illustrated in Fig. 1 where 
several current UAVs are pictured, 
along with their locations on a 
logarithmic mass scale. 
For the purposes of this analysis, 
the following classes of UAVs are 
defined and primarily differentiated by 
mass: Micro, Mini, Tactical, Medium 
Altitude, and High Altitude/ UCAV 
(Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle.). 
While there is currently not a 
consensus on classifications for flight 
in civil airspace, these definitions are consistent with nomenclature used by both research and military communities. 
An estimation of the boundaries of each class in terms of UAV mass is also shown in Fig. 1. 
The maximum operating altitude of several current UAVs, was assembled from public sources2 and is shown in 
Fig. 2. There are are several 
divisions in potential operations 
between the classes. Micro UAVs 
are typically limited to short 
operating ranges, at low altitude, 
and weigh less than 1 lb.. Mini 
UAVs are operated at intermediate 
altitudes, and can potentially reach 
the boundary of controlled 
airspace at 18,000 ft. Mini UAVs 
are typically between 1 and 40 lbs. 
The tactical designation is 
borrowed from military UAV 
operation, and denotes a UAV that 
can sometimes be capable of over 
the horizon operation, and 
operated at low to intermediate 
altitudes. Tactical UAVs typically 
weight between 60 and 1,000 lbs. Medium and high altitude UAVs, as well as UCAV’s generally weigh more than 
1,000 lbs. Medium altitude UAVs are typically operated around the region of Class A airspace, while high alttitude 
UAVs can potentially be operated above the majority of commercial air traffic. 
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Figure 1.  Spectrum of Current UAVs 
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III. System Safety Analysis Methodology 
In order to examine the safety implications of several potential classes of UAV operation, a preliminary hazard 
analysis (PHA) was performed following Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) system safety analysis guidelines3. 
An approach was taken to identify critical hazards associated with operation of a UAV system, develop a model of 
the expected magnitude of each risk, and determine implications for UAV design and operation. The methodology 
used is consistent with the system safety literature4, and was also informed by FAA advisory circulars for manned 
aircraft5,6. 
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To maintain general applicability to a range of UAV systems, a consequence-based approach to the identification 
of hazards was taken. This approach focused on the most severe classifications of events‡. From comparison to 
manned aircraft reliability requirements, events with the most severe consequences are typically the critical design 
drivers of the system. Two leading concerns in UAV operation with respect to public safety are ground impact and 
midair collisions with other manned aircraft. Although other hazards may be present, the critical hazards of ground 
impact and midair collision will be discussed below. 
It is recognized that several factors other than safety will also influence the integration of UAVs into the NAS. 
Public perception of risks and benefits of UAV operation, as well as the concerns of other stakeholders in the system 
will also influence FAA safety policy. Nonetheless, safety is expected to remain a fundamental criterion for 
operations in the NAS. 
IV. Ground Impact Hazard 
A model of UAV ground impact was created to investigate the influence of different factors on the expected 
level of safety in terms of ground fatalities per hour of operation of general UAV systems. The model incorporated 
total system reliability, UAV size and energy, and population characteristics in the vicinity of operation. The factors 
are analyzed to determine UAV system reliability requirements to meet a target level of safety. 
A. Target Level of Safety 
It is assumed that the ground impact event considered in this analysis will result in a small number of fatalities, 
and are therefore categorized by FAA criteria3 as a hazardous event. The target level of safety of a hazardous event, 
as specified by FAA requirements for manned aircraft is 10-7 events per hour of operation3,5,6. A review of the NTSB 
database on air carrier and general aviation accidents showed that this level of safety is consistent with the current 
level of safety of manned aircraft with respect to ground fatalities, approximately equal to 2 x 10-7 ground fatalities 
per hour of operation over the last ten years7. The target level of safety used for the ground analysis was set an order 
of magnitude beyond that required to manned systems, at 10-8 fatalities per hour, in realization that UAVs may need 
to exceed the current level of safety of manned operations. 
B. Ground Impact Model 
The ground impact of a UAV was modeled by the basic scenario shown in the event tree of Fig. 3. The ground 
fatality model presumes that a failure on the vehicle occurs, resulting in an uncontrolled ground impact. The model 
then considers whether a person is located where the UAV impacts, and if the debris from the crash penetrates the 
sheltering in which the person is located. Probabilistic analysis of the serial combination of the four events describes 
the expected level of safety of the system (ELS) in terms of expected fatalities per hour of operation of the system. 
Failures of the UAV system 
are modeled to occur at an 
average rate given by a mean time 
between failures, MTBF. The 
expected number of failures per 
hour is the inverse of the term. 
The failures considered are of any 
general type that could result in 
ground impact, including failures 
of any component of the UAV 
system or human error. 
Ground impact of the UAV 
“exposes” the general public to 
harm, but does not necessarily 
directly result in a fatality. The exposure effect was modeled using a debris-footprint based exposure model, 
developed and used for assessing the risk to the general public from space launch activities8,9. By this formulation, 
the UAV accident exposes a certain area of the ground to harm, denoted, Aexp. Then, the expected number of people 
exposed to harm is the product of the area of exposure and the population density of the area, ρ, in number of people 
per square foot. 
 Failure of UAV 
System? 
Impact in 
Populated 
Area? 
None 
Debris Penetration 
of Sheltering? 
Resulting 
Penetration 
Fatal?
Harm to Public 
on Ground 
None 
None 
Possible Injury 
Fatality 
Recovery 
Accident No 
Exposure to Debris No 
Penetration No 
Yes 
Figure 3. Ground Impact Event Tree 
                                                          
‡ The two most severe events categories are hazardous and catastrophic. A hazardous event is defined as resulting in “fatal 
injury to ground personnel and/or general public,” while a catastrophic event “Results in multiple fatalities and/or loss of the 
system.” (Ref 3) 
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The ground impact model also incorporates population sheltering effects, consistent with previous applications. 
This aspect of the model recognizes that not all UAV impacts are fatal. The debris must penetrate sheltering, such as 
vehicles, houses, or other buildings in which the general public is located. The probability that the debris will 
penetrate shelter given exposure is model by the penetration factor, Ppen. 
It should be noted that there are several measures that can mitigate the risk of occurrence of a ground fatality. 
They can be included at any point of the event tree of Fig. 3. All mitigating events are collected and arranged in a 
term denoted as the probability of mitigation, Pmit. The probability of mitigation reflects the probability that a ground 
fatality does not occur, due to mitigation measures, even though it has been modeled to occur by the assumed 
sequence of events. Thus, the expected level of safety of the system is increased by 1 minus Pmit. For the baseline 
case, mitigation is not considered, and the term is set to unity. The resulting formulation for the expected level of 
safety of a UAV operation with respect to ground impact is given by Eq. (1). 
 (exp Pen mit1ELS= A ρP 1-PMTBF )  (1) 
C. Model Application 
The ground impact model of Eq. (1) was applied to 
four UAVs from the HALE, Tactical, Mini, and Micro 
classifications. A summary of the parameters of the 
model are shown in Table 1. 
The expected level of safety of the system 
estimated by the ground impact model was assumed to 
be set by the target level of safety to satisfy system 
safety requirements. Therefore, the variation of risk is 
investigated as a function of the mean time between 
failures to meet the required target level of safety. As 
previously introduced, the target level of safety used 
for the analyses was 1 x 10-8 fatalities per hour of 
operation. 
The area of exposure of the UAV is estimated as 
the frontal area of the UAV, and population density 
data were used from the 2000 U.S. Census10 for tract gr
many factors, including the energy of the vehicle, the am
distribution of people within those structures. For this gen
penetration was used. It is realized that the factor will var
preliminary estimates of the probability of penetration for
and 90% respectively. 
D. Results 
As can be seen in Eq. (1), the expected level of safe
function of the mean time between failures of the vehicle
level of safety of 10-8 fatalities/hr of operation, the groun
of mean time between failures that result in ground impac
the required reliability is shown in Fig. 4. The proportion
given range is also tabulated in the legend. It should be no
catastrophic, and would represent an increase in the reliab
There are two important trends evident in the result
vehicle classes, there is a significant variation in require
high-velocity UAVs, operation over the majority of the 
such that the time between failures is much greater than
much lower risk to the general public, and could be oper
100 hours required between failures. Tactical UAVs repre
The second trend evident in the figures is the two ord
populated areas. This is most evident in the reliability 
easily identify the increased population density around ma
American Institute of AeTable 1. UAV Classes for Ground Impact Analysis 
UAV Examples Weight Aexp
Estimated
PPen
HALE 25,600 lb 970 ft2 90% 
Tactical 
 
351 lb 5 ft2 25% 
Mini 
 
9.6 lb 1.7 ft2 10% 
Micro 0.14 lb 0.26 ft2 5% oups. The probability of penetration, Ppen, will depend on 
ount of energy several structures can withstand, and the 
eral approach, a single factor estimate of the probability of 
y from 0% to 100% from low to high energy impacts. The 
 Micro, Mini, Tactical, and Hale UAVs is 5%, 10%, 25%, 
 
(2.16 oz) 
ty of a UAV system with respect to ground fatalities is a 
 system. By fixing the expected level of safety at the target 
d impact model generates the reliability required (in terms 
t) to meet the target level of safety. The spatial variation of 
 of the U.S. for which the reliability required is within the 
ted that some UAV ground impacts may be categorized as 
ility required beyond the values shown in the figure. 
s of the ground impact model. First, comparing the four 
d reliability with the mass of the vehicle. For high-mass, 
United States would require that the vehicle be designed 
 10,000 hours. However, Mini and Micro UAVs present 
ated over the majority of the United States with less than 
sent an intermediate level of risk. 
er of magnitude increase in reliability required to overfly 
requirements for tactical and mini UAVs, where one can 
jor cities such as New York, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, and 
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Los Angeles. Recognizing this trend, one possible low-risk integration strategy is to segregate UAV operations from 
high population areas. 
It should be noted that this preliminary analysis did not include possible mitigation measures, such as flight 
termination systems, emergency parachute recovery systems, or other measures that would lessen the severity of 
ground impact. Inclusion of such capabilities in aircraft could also be used to achieve an acceptable level of safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HALE: 25,600 lb Mean time  % of US by Area 
between failures HALE Tactical Mini Micro 
Less than 1 hr 6.3% 14.8% 34.0% 72.4% 
1 to 100 hr 0.0% 58.1% 60.8% 26.8% 
100 to 10,000 hr 37.7% 26.4% 5.2% 0.7% 
over 10,000 hr 56.0% 0.7% 0.02% 0.01% 
Tactical: 328 lb 
Mini: 9.6 lb Micro: 2.12 oz. 
Figure 4. Reliability Required to Meet a Target Level of Safety of 10-8 fatalities / hr 
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V. Midair Collision Hazard 
A model of midair collisions between UAVs and other aircraft was developed. The model incorporates air traffic 
density data from an FAA surveillance source to determine the expected number of collisions per hour of UAV 
flight. The target level of safety for the midair collision hazard from FAA safety guidelines for manned aircraft, is 
10-9 collisions per hour3. The expected level of safety was investigated in several regions of the NAS, first averaged 
from sea level to 50,000 ft, and then around jet routes and victor airways. The analysis provides insight into the 
variation of collision risk with respect to structure of the NAS and the possibility of low-risk operating strategies and 
requirements for mitigation. 
A. Midair Collision Risk Model 
The potential for midair collision between a UAV and 
several other aircraft was modeled based on a gas model of 
aircraft collisions11. In this model, the UAV is equally likely to 
be located anywhere in the volume of airspace under 
investigation. Additionally, its velocity is assumed to be small 
compared to the threatened aircraft. When threatened aircraft 
fly within the volume of airspace, they extrude potential 
collision volumes. The expected level of safety in terms of 
potential collisions per hour of UAV operation is then the ratio 
of volume extruded by threatened aircraft per hour to the 
volume of airspace. 
The midair collision model is shown in Fig. 5. Each aircraft 
flies a distance, di through the airspace segment under 
consideration. Each threatened aircraft also has an area of 
exposure, Aexp, representing the contact area that is vulnerable 
to a collision. For the preliminary analysis the area of exposure 
was estimated as the frontal area of a 757, approximately 560 
ft2. The area of exposure also does not vary significantly with 
UAV classification, assuming the UAV area is small compared to the threatened aircraft. 
The area of exposure, extruded over the distance flown represents a potential collision volume. The total 
collision volume for threatened aircraft is the area of exposure times the sum of the distances flown by aircraft in the 
airspace under consideration. Because an expected collision occurs if the exposure volume overlaps with the UAV, 
the expected number of collisions is equal to the ratio of total collision volume to the volume of airspace. 
To generate a sufficient sample of the average behavior of air traffic, the total distance flown is calculated over a 
given period of time, t. The expected collision rate is equal to the expected number of collisions divided by time. 
However, though a potential collision may occur, there is the possibility that it may not result in fatality, either by 
direct avoidance of the collision, or by mitigating the magnitude of the collision. Recognizing this, an additional 
mitigation term is included in the model, Pfat|coll , which is the conditional probability that the collision is fatal given 
that there was an expected potential collision. Combining all terms gives the expected level of safety in terms of 
fatal accidents per hour, shown in Eq. (2). For the baseline analysis, mitigation was not included, therefore the final 
probability term is assumed to equal unity. 
UAV 
d1 
Aexp
1st Threatened 
Aircraft 
nth Threatened 
Aircraft 
Aexp 
dn 
Airspace 
Volume 
1st Collision 
Volume 
nth Collision 
Volume 
to
-
-
 
Figure 5. Midair Collision Model 
 exp
fat|coll
A d
ELS   P
Vt
=  (2) 
B. Data Source 
In order to investigate air traffic patterns in the NAS, data were obtained from the FAA Enhanced Traffic 
Management System (ETMS) on all surveilled flights over the U.S. for one day in January 2004. The data are 
organized as position and altitude surveillance gathered from both primary and secondary radar returns and represent 
all aircraft visible to air traffic control. Where radar coverage is not available, especially at low altitude where 
obscured from terrain, flight trajectories are not included in the database or are incomplete. Some vehicles which are 
not tracked by the system, such as ultralights and some general aviation aircraft are not included. Therefore, the 
dataset represents an under-sampling of traffic density in the NAS. Additionally, as traffic density is averaged over 
24 hours in the analysis, the results may also represent an underestimation of the expected level of safety per hour. 
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C. Average Midair Collision Risk over the United States 
To develop a preliminary estimate of midair collision risk, the variation of expected level of safety spatially over 
the United States was investigated, assuming that the UAV was equally likely to be located from sea level to  
50,000 ft, neglecting effects of elevation. The model of midair collisions given by Eq. (1) was applied to all air 
traffic from sea level to 50,000 ft over the United States. The resulting expected level of safety over several regions 
of the country is shown in Fig. 6. 
The results highlight several spatial trends in traffic density, and proportionally, expected level of safety. First, 
the majority of the collision risk is concentrated over metropolitan areas with major airports by approximately an 
order of magnitude. Second, the structure of air traffic in the NAS is clear, with large collision risk along several 
well-traveled routes. The expected level of safety calculated using this method does not adequately capture the 
expected level of safety in low density regions. The structure of operations on flight levels and along airways is 
likely to create local regions of increased density in dimensions not analyzed by this method. 
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airway centerline was not investigated. 
Traffic density, and therefore collision risk, is expected to be highest on major flight levels and within the airway 
boundaries, reflecting the operation of the majority of air traffic along airways in the NAS. Traffic density is 
expected to be lowest both off flight levels and away from airway boundaries. Traffic in this region is expected to be 
in transition between flight levels and airway waypoints (in two dimensions). The remaining two regions, where 
transition is expected in only one dimension, should have densities somewhere in between the other regions. 
To adequately capture behavior within the regions shown in Fig. 7, flights from the ETMS database were 
transformed from latitude, longitude, and altitude into local airway coordinates, measured by cross-track deviation 
from the airway centerline, altitude, and length along the airway. A three-dimensional interpolation was then 
performed to determine the distance traveled along bins measuring 0.25 nm in width and 100 ft in altitude. Distance 
flown was aggregated for all aircraft, representing a measure of the flight density in each bin. The midair collision 
model was then applied and the expected level of safety was averaged along the length of all airways jet routes and a 
subset of victor airways in the NAS. 
E. Midair Collision Risk in the Vicinity of Jet Routes 
To investigate the variation of collision risk around jet routes, air traffic density was aggregated over all jet 
routes in the United States, using the method described in the previous section. This included 263 routes, totaling 
184,000 nm in length. The expected level of safety in terms of collisions per hour was calculated using the midair 
collision model of Eq. (2). The variation in expected level of safety in the vicinity of airways is shown in several 
dimensions in Fig. 8. To maintain general applicability to a wide range of UAV operations, the expected level of 
safety was averaged over the length of all jet routes, representing the general behavior of traffic around airway 
structure. Density may vary locally along individual airways due to the behavior of traffic in the area. 
Figure 8a shows the contours of expected level of safety with respect to both cross-track deviation and altitude. 
The different regions of the expected level of safety are evident in the shading of the contour plot. Each dimension is 
further analyzed in Figs. 8b to 8d. Very high collision risk is washed out in Fig. 8a, denoted by the largest and 
darkest bin representing a risk above 1 x 10-6 collisions / hr. For the baseline case without mitigating action, there 
are few regions in the vicinity of airways with an expected level of safety below the target level of safety of  
10-9 collisions per hour. 
To examine the variation of collision risk with altitude while operating within airway boundaries, the average 
collision risk within 4 nm of the airway centerline along flight levels is shown in Figs. 8b and 8c. Jet routes show a 
clear stratification of density, and therefore expected level of safety along major flight levels. The 1,000 ft 
separation between flight levels from FL 180 to FL 290 and 2,000 ft separation from FL 290 to FL 450 are apparent 
in both Figs 8b and 8c. The highest average collision risk on an airway is at FL 370, and is approximately 4 x 10-5 
collisions / hr. The lowest collision risk is on the order of 10-9 above FL 430. 
Figures 8d and 8e show the variation of collision risk with distance from the airway for several altitudes on and 
off major airways respectively. There is a consistent pattern for all altitudes under investigation, with a large 
increase in the expected level of safety within approximately 2 nm of the airway centerline, and a constant risk 
outside of the airway boundaries. The baseline expected level of safety is on the order of 2 x 10-7 collisions / hr, off 
airways and off major flight levels. 
There is a two order of magnitude difference between regions on major flight levels and airways, and off flight 
levels, away from the airway. The overall collision risk estimates still do not meet the target level of safety. 
However, it should be noted that these numbers do not reflect any avoidance maneuvers undertaken by the aircraft. 
To meet the FAA standard target level of safety, those measures would have to add two orders of magnitude to the 
target level of safety beyond the baseline level. The area above FL 450, although not shown in the figure, has a 
collision risk on the order of 10-9 collisions / hr over all regions. Thus, an initial strategy of operating UAVs above 
FL 450 can have great advantages, as long as control strategies for ascent and descent through high-density regions 
are undertaken to reduce risk. 
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Figure 8. Average Expected Level of Safety in the Vicinity of all Jet Routes in the United States 
F. Midair Collision Risk in the Vicinity of Victor Airways 
To adequately capture the behavior around victor airways, it was necessary to select an area of the country with 
sufficient radar coverage at low altitude. It was also desired to find a region with a high density of air traffic. Under 
these criteria, flight traffic in the vicinity of victor airways within the NE corridor of the United States was analyzed. 
This included portions of 102 separate airways, totaling 13,000 nm in length. The average expected level of safety 
was calculated based on the midair collision model of Eq. (2). The variation in expected level of safety in the 
vicinity of airways is shown in several dimensions in Fig. 9. To maintain general applicability to a wide range of 
UAV operations, the expected level of safety was averaged over the length of all victor airways in the NE, 
representing the general behavior of traffic around airway structure. Density may vary locally along individual 
airways due to the behavior of traffic in the area, and may be lower in other regions of the country with a lower 
density of aircraft. The expected level of safety over victor airways exhibits similar stratification to jet routes in both 
dimensions, as shown in Figs. 9a and 9b. 
Figure 9c shows the variation of collision risk with altitude, averaged within 4 nm of the airway centerline. 
Unlike traffic around jet routes, the expected level of safety does not vary significantly with altitude at the lower 
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boundaries of airspace, below 5,000 ft. This trend is likely due to the behavior of flights in the vicinity of airports in 
the region. The majority of traffic at low altitudes is likely to be maneuvering during departure and arrival. 
Likewise, the high density is likely to extend to ground level, but the traffic dataset is under-sampled in this region 
due to terrain blockage of radar returns. Above 5,000 ft in altitude, 1,000 ft. separation between flight levels is again 
apparent, and maximum collision is on the order of 7 x 10-6 collisions / hr at 18,000 ft. 
Figures 9d and 9e show the variation of collision risk with distance from the airway for sample altitudes on and 
off major airways respectively. Again, the results are dissimilar to jet routes at low altitude, with little variation in 
risk with distance from airway centerline. However, as altitude increases, there is an increase in collision risk within 
approximately 2 nm of the airway centerline. The expected level of safety off airway and off major flight levels is on 
the order of 3 x 10-7 collisions / hr, at both 6,200 ft and 13,300 ft. This is close to the ambient risk off major altitudes 
and off airway for jet routes. 
Similar to the expected level of safety in the vicinity of jet routes, there is a two order of magnitude difference 
between regions on major flight levels and on airways, and off flight level, away from the airway. The overall 
collision risk estimates still do not meet the target level of safety. However, it should be noted that the risk estimated 
for victor airways do not reflect any avoidance maneuvers undertaken by the aircraft. To meet the FAA standard 
target level of safety, those measures would have to add two orders of magnitude to the target level of safety beyond 
the initial level of safety. An additional low risk area of operation where behavior was not analyzed may be very 
close to the ground, in uncontrolled airspace. 
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Figure 9 Average Expected Level of Safety in the Vicinity of Victor Airways in the NE Corridor 
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VI. Conclusions 
A preliminary hazard analysis was performed for ground impact and midair collisions of UAV systems. Results 
from models of the event showed significant variation in the expected level. Ground impact risk varied significantly 
based on population density, and was significantly higher for high-mass and high-velocity UAVs. Midair collision 
risk varied by two orders of magnitude between flight on airways, on major flight levels and away from airways, off 
major flight levels. 
It was found that it may be possible to operate small UAVs in the NAS, such as those classified as Micro or Mini 
UAVs, away from only the most densely populous cities. The UAVs could be operated with a mean time between 
failures of 100 hours, to meet a target level of safety 1 x 10-8 fatalities per hour of operation. This reliability is within 
the capability demonstrated by several current UAV systems13. To satisfy midair collision safety requirements, two 
orders of magnitude of mitigation would be required along with procedural separation of UAVs from high density 
air routes. Active mitigation measures could include using frangible UAVs that impart less damage an equivalent 
bird strike, or simple avoidance measures that avoid all aircraft with transponder signals. There is also the 
opportunity to operate at the boundaries of the NAS, either close to the ground or at very high altitude, where traffic 
density may be much lower, or the requirements of controlled airspace do not apply. 
Significant mitigation would be required to operate higher mass UAVs in the NAS. Under the assumptions of the 
analysis performed, high altitude UAVs pose a significantly greater risk than other classes, and tactical UAVs 
represent an intermediate risk level. While the threat posed by higher mass UAVs may be greater, they can also 
incorporate more sophisticated mitigation measures to prevent midair collisions, such as sense and avoid systems, or 
active air traffic control separation, an area which is the focus of a great deal of current research. Tactical UAVs 
inhabit an intermediate region, where a combination of mitigation and procedural separation may be required to 
meet system safety standards. 
Significant future UAV operations are expected to emerge in the NAS. The type and magnitude of mitigation 
employed to meet system safety standards will vary significantly between classes of UAVs. Integration strategies 
and mitigation measures applied to large UAVs are not necessarily required or applicable to small UAVs. 
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